Border gateway protocol (BGP) security measures along autonomous system (AS) paths

ABSTRACT

Systems, methods, and devices of the various embodiments disclosed herein may provide Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security measures along autonomous system (AS) paths. Various embodiments may provide transparency as to the local security measures implemented along an AS path. Various embodiments may enable routing along secure paths. Various embodiments may enable the selection of AS paths based on a comparison of the security implemented along the AS paths. Various embodiments may reduce the impact of BGP attacks.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of, and claims the benefit ofpriority to, U.S. Non-Provisional patent application Ser. No. 15/990,861entitled “Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Security Measures AlongAutonomous System (AS) Paths,” filed May 29, 2018, now U.S. Pat. No.10,644,990, the entire contents of which is hereby incorporated byreference for all purposes.

BACKGROUND

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other types of Internet connectednetworks continually face the threat of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)attacks. In a BGP attack, a malicious attacker causes Internet trafficto be misrouted and/or mishandled by manipulating BGP routing data. Themisrouting and/or mishandling of Internet traffic due to BGP hijacksrepresents a significant security threat to ISPs and other Internetconnected networks, as well as Internet users, as traffic can beforwarded through malicious computing devices and is often not forwardedto its intended destination at all.

SUMMARY

The systems, methods, and devices of the various embodiments disclosedherein may provide Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security measures alongautonomous system (AS) paths. Various embodiments may providetransparency as to the local security measures implemented along an ASpath. Various embodiments may enable routing along secure paths. Variousembodiments may enable the selection of AS paths based on a comparisonof the security implemented along the AS paths. Various embodiments mayreduce the impact of BGP attacks.

Various embodiments may provide a method of selecting a secure BGP pathperformed by a processor of a computing device, such as a router. Themethod may include receiving a packet for routing to a route prefix,determining any available paths to the route prefix, determining asecurity cost for each available path based at least in part on any pathsecurity attributes associated with that respective available path,modifying a path length for the available paths according to theirrespective security costs, selecting a path for routing the packet fromthe available paths based at least in part on the modified path lengths,and routing the packet to the route prefix along the selected path. Invarious embodiments, modifying the path length for the available pathsaccording to their respective security costs may include adding thesecurity cost to a hop count for each respective available path. Invarious embodiments, the security costs may be values determined byapplying one or more security discount associated with one or more typesof security. In various embodiments, the path security attributes may beattributes indicated in BGP update messages received for the availablepaths. In various embodiments, the path security attributes may indicateone or more types of security applied by autonomous systems in theavailable paths. In various embodiments, selecting the path for routingthe packet from the available paths based at least in part on themodified path lengths may include using the path security attributes asa tie breaker between paths having matching modified path lengths.

Various embodiments may provide a method for advertising a secure BGPpath performed by a processor of a computing device, such as a router.The method may include receiving an indication of a route prefix toadvertise, determining one or more current security settings, generatinga BGP message including indications of any current security settings asone or more path security attributes, and sending the BGP messageincluding the one or more path security attributes. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may indicate oneor more types of security applied by the computing device. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may be indicatedas bit values in the BGP message. In various embodiments, the one ormore path security attributes are indicated as transitive attributes inthe BGP message.

Further embodiments disclosed herein include a computing device having aprocessor configured with processor-executable instructions to performoperations of the methods summarized above. Further embodimentsdisclosed herein include a computing device including means forperforming functions of the methods summarized above. Furtherembodiments disclosed herein include a non-transitory processor-readablestorage medium having stored thereon processor-executable instructionsconfigured to cause a computing device processor to perform operationsof the methods summarized above.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated herein and constitutepart of this specification, illustrate exemplary embodiments, andtogether with the general description given above and the detaileddescription given below, serve to explain the features of variousembodiments.

FIG. 1 is a communication system block diagram of an Internet Protocol(IP) network suitable for use with various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a process flow diagram illustrating an embodiment method foradvertising a secure Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) path.

FIG. 3A is a process flow diagram illustrating an embodiment method forstoring path security attributes.

FIG. 3B is a process flow diagram illustrating an embodiment method forselecting a secure BGP path.

FIG. 4A is a communication system block diagram illustrating selectionof a secure BGP path in an IP network according to an embodiment.

FIG. 4B is a block diagram comparing modified path lengths between pathsof the IP network of FIG. 4A.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an example security cost table according toan embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an example path security attributeaccording to an embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a communication system block diagram illustrating selection ofa secure BGP path in an IP network according to an embodiment.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram comparing modified path lengths between pathsof the IP network of FIG. 7.

FIG. 9 is a communication system block diagram illustrating selection ofsecure BGP paths in an IP network according to an embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a component block diagram of an example computing devicesuitable for use with the various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a component diagram of an example server suitable for usewith the various embodiments.

FIG. 12 is a component diagram of an example router suitable for usewith the various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The various embodiments will be described in detail with reference tothe accompanying drawings. Wherever possible, the same reference numberswill be used throughout the drawings to refer to the same or like parts.References made to particular examples and implementations are forillustrative purposes, and are not intended to limit the scope of theinvention or the claims.

As used herein, the terms “computing device” is used interchangeablyherein to refer to any one or all of satellite or cable set top boxes,laptop computers, rack mounted computers, routers, switch, cable modemtermination systems (CMTSs), cellular telephones, smart phones, personalor mobile multi-media players, personal data assistants (PDAs), personalcomputers, tablet computers, smart books, palm-top computers, desk-topcomputers, wireless electronic mail receivers, multimedia Internetenabled cellular telephones, wireless gaming controllers, streamingmedia players (such as, ROKU™, AppleTV™), smart televisions, digitalvideo recorders (DVRs), modems, and similar electronic devices whichinclude a programmable processor and memory and circuitry for providingthe functionality described herein.

The various embodiments are described herein using the term “server” torefer to any computing device capable of functioning as a server, suchas communications server, a name server, a master exchange server, webserver, mail server, document server, database server, route server,content server, or any other type of server. A server may be a dedicatedcomputing device or a computing device including a server module (e.g.,running an application which may cause the computing device to operateas a server). A server module (e.g., server application) may be a fullfunction server module, or a light or secondary server module (e.g.,light or secondary server application) that is configured to providesynchronization services among the dynamic databases on computingdevices. A light server or secondary server may be a slimmed-downversion of server-type functionality that can be implemented on acomputing device thereby enabling it to function as a server only to theextent necessary to provide the functionality described herein.

The various embodiments are described herein using the term “router” torefer to any computing device capable of functioning as a router, suchas an edge router, a core router, a boundary router, or any other typeof router. A router may be any computing device that may be configuredto forward data, such as Internet Protocol (IP) packets, from onecomputing device to another computing device. A router may be adedicated computing device or a computing device including a routermodule (e.g., running an application which may cause the computingdevice to operate as a router).

According to Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), an Autonomous Systems (AS),such as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), that is assigned a range ofInternet Protocol (IP) addresses, i.e., a netblock, may advertise orannounce that the netblock is reachable by announcing a route to the ASwith a route prefix for the netblock in a BGP update. A route prefix mayindicate a netblock's IP address prefix and a length of the IP addressprefix as a number of bits. For example, an AS assigned the netblock“24.158.32.0” may cause traffic to be routed to it by sending a BGPupdate from its routers (e.g., peer routers, edge routers, etc.)announcing a route with the route prefix “24.158.32.0/19”. The routeprefix “24.158.32.0/19” indicates the IP address prefix of the netblockof the AS “24.158.32.0” and that the AS's IP address prefixes are 19bits long.

In BGP, the number of ASs through which a packet must travel along apath to reach the AS the packet is addressed to may be that path's pathlength. The path length may refer to a number of hops through which thepacket may travel to reach the AS to which the packet is addressed, witheach hop representing a unique AS number (ASN) the packet is routedthrough along the path. BGP path lengths may be determined in BGP bycounting the number of unique ASNs in a BGP update advertising a path.As BGP messages that advertise paths are received by routers, the pathsand their attributes may be stored in routing tables for use in routingpackets along those paths. In response to receiving a packet addressedto a route prefix, a router may determine the available paths to theroute prefix stored in its routing table. The router may determine thepath lengths for each available path and may select the route with thelowest path length as the path to use for routing the packet. When therouter identifies a tie between lowest path lengths, additional criteriabeyond path length may be used to break the tie and select the path touse for routing the packet.

In a BGP attack, a malicious attacker may cause Internet traffic to bemisrouted by announcing a malicious path for a route prefix themalicious attacker is not actually assigned. For example, an AS maynormally announce a routing prefix of “10.0.0.0/24” indicating that ASis the origin for that routing prefix (i.e., the origin AS). Themalicious attacker may announce a malicious path with the routing prefix“10.0.0.0/24” as well, thereby falsely advertising itself as the originof that routing prefix (i.e., the bad AS). The announcement of themalicious route may be propagated from router to router according to BGPand the malicious route may be used to route Internet traffic when thepath length for the malicious route to a bad AS is shorter than the pathlength for the good route to the origin AS. In this manner, themalicious attacker may hijack packets with the routing prefix“10.0.0.0/24” because the malicious route will be used for routingInternet traffic.

Some ASs, such as ISPs and other Internet connected networks, attempt tostop BGP attacks by deploying conventional local security measures thatprovide of limited efficacy. Example conventional local securitymeasures may include but are not limited to using prefix tagging,applying local preference settings, setting maximum prefix limits,prefix filtering using the Routing Assets Database (RADb), certifyingresources using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), andimplementing the BGPsec protocol (BGPsec). Such conventional localsecurity measures have not been adopted across all networks connected tothe Internet, further limiting the protection afforded by suchconventional local security measures. Due to their limited adoption,conventional local security measures have not effectively reduced thethreat of BGP attacks, and the misrouting and/or mishandling of Internettraffic due to BGP hijacks continues to represents a significantsecurity threat to ISPs and other Internet connected networks, as wellas Internet users, despite the presence of conventional local securitymeasures

The systems, methods, and devices of the various embodiments may provideBGP security measures along AS paths. Various embodiments may enablesecure BGP paths to be advertised by a computing device of an AS, suchas a router (e.g., peer router, edge router, etc.). In variousembodiments, a computing device, such as a router, may receive anindication of a route prefix to advertise. As one example, theindication of a route prefix to advertise may be a BGP update messagereceived from another router. As another example, the indication of aroute prefix to advertise may be an indication that the computing deviceitself is the origin for the route prefix. In various embodiments, thecomputing device may determine one or more current security settings.The one or more current security settings may be local security measuresapplied by the computing device to packets routed by the AS of thecomputing device. Current security settings may include using prefixtagging, applying local preference settings, setting maximum prefixlimits, prefix filtering using RADb, certifying resources using RPKI,implementing BGPsec, or any other local security measure currently beingapplied by the AS of the computing device. In various embodiments, thecomputing device may generate a BGP message, such as a BGP updatemessage, indicating the current security settings as one or more pathsecurity attributes. In various embodiments, the one or more pathsecurity attributes may indicate one or more types of security appliedby the AS of the computing device, such as one more types of securityapplied by the computing device. In various embodiments, the one or morepath security attributes may be indicated as bit values in the BGPmessage. For example, each bit value in a string of bit values mayrepresent whether or not a type of security was applied. The indicationof the one or more types of security applied in the BGP message mayprovide transparency as to the local security measures implemented alongan AS path. In various embodiments, the one or more path securityattributes may be indicated as transitive attributes in the BGP message.For example, a transitive flag may be set for the one or more pathsecurity attributes in the BGP message. In this manner, though an AS maynot be configured to handle the one or more path security attributes,when the AS advertises the route based on the BGP message, the one ormore path security attributes may be preserved.

Various embodiments may enable routing along secure paths. In variousembodiments, computing device of an AS, such as a router (e.g., peerrouter, edge router, etc.), may receive a BGP message including one ormore path security attributes. In various embodiments, the computingdevice may store the path security attributes for a route prefixassociated with the BGP message. For example, the computing device mayupdate a routing table to include the path security attributes. Invarious embodiments, in response to storing the path securityattributes, the computing device may append its own routing information,such as its respective ASN and its own one or more path securityattributes to the routing information in the BGP message and advertisethe path to the route prefix via a new BGP message. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may be carried inthe BGP message in addition to, and in a similar manner to, AS Pathattributes.

Various embodiments may enable the selection of AS paths based on acomparison of the security implemented along the AS paths. Variousembodiments may enable the selection of a secure BGP path. In variousembodiments, a computing device of an AS, such as a router (e.g., peerrouter, edge router, etc.), may receive a packet for routing to a routeprefix and determine the available paths to the route prefix. Forexample, the computing device may compare the route prefix to entries ina routing table to identify the available paths. In various embodiments,the computing device may determine a security cost for each availablepath based on each path's security attributes. In various embodiments,security costs may be determined by applying security discountsassociated with types of security applied by each AS in the availablepaths. In various embodiments, the computing device may modify a pathlength for the available paths according to their respective securitycosts. For example, a determined security cost may be added to the pathlength for an available path thereby resulting in a modified pathlength. The computing device may select a path from the available pathsbased at least in part on the modified path length. In variousembodiments, selecting the path may include breaking a tie between pathswith matching modified path lengths based at least in part on the pathsecurity attributes. For example, a path applying security, or a certaintype of security, may be selected over a path not applying security.

Various embodiments may reduce the impact of BGP attacks by increasingthe length of a malicious path to a bad AS. Security may not be appliedin the malicious path to the bad AS, which may have enabled the BGPattack to be initiated. In various embodiments, based on the securitycost of the malicious path being higher as the malicious path may notapply security, the modified path length for the malicious path may belonger than the modified path length for a secure path. In this manner,the secure path may be selected over the malicious path in variousembodiments.

Various examples of different protocols are discussed herein, such asBGP. The discussions of specific protocols, such as BGP, are providedmerely as examples to better illustrate the aspects of the variousembodiments, and are not intended to limit the various embodiments inany way. Other protocols may be used with the various embodiments, andthe other protocols may be substituted in the various examples withoutdeparting from the spirit or scope of the invention.

FIG. 1 illustrates an IP network 100 suitable for use with variousembodiments. The IP network 100 may include multiple devices, such asrouters 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, and computing devices 103, 104, 106,120, 121, 150. While each router 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 is illustratedin FIG. 1 as a single device, each router 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may beone or more routers of an AS. The routers 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 andcomputing devices 103, 104, 106, 120, 121, 150 or the network 100 mayexchange data with one another according to IP protocols via theirvarious connections with one another. Collectively, the connectionsbetween the routers 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may represent the Internetand the data routed between the routers 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may beInternet traffic. The routers 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may exchangerouting information with one another according to BGP. Each router 110,111, 112, 113, 115 may have its own respective ASN assigned to it todistinguish one router from another router.

A router 110 of an AS, such as an ISP, may be connected to variouscomputing devices receiving service from that entity, such as computingdevices 103, 104, 106. A router 115 of a different entity, such as adifferent ISP, may be connected to various computing devices receivingservice from that entity, such as computing devices 120, 121. A range ofIP addresses, i.e., a netblock, may be assigned to each different entity(e.g., on a per ASN basis), and the respective computing devices of thatentity may be assigned IP addresses within that netblock. Each netblockmay have a different route prefix. For example, computing devices 103,104, 106 connected to the router 110 of a first entity may have IPaddresses within that first entity's netblock identified by a firstroute prefix and computing devices 121, 121 connected to router 115 of asecond entity may have IP addresses with the second entity's netblockidentified by a second route prefix. As the first route prefix of thefirst netblock may identify that the netblock is associated with therouter 110, Internet traffic destined for IP addresses in the firstnetblock may be routed to router 110 by the other routers 111, 112, 113,115. Similarly, as the second route prefix of the second netblock mayidentify that the netblock is associated with the router 115, Internettraffic destined for IP addresses in the second netblock may be routedto router 115 by the other routers 110, 111, 112, 113.

The various routers 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may exchange BGP messageswith one another to create, update, and withdraw routing paths among oneanother in their respective routing tables. As BGP events occur, BGP logmessages, such as BGP messages reflecting BGP updates, BGP withdraws,etc., may be generated and sent from the routers 110, 111, 112, 113,115.

During normal operation, routing of Internet traffic among the routers110, 111, 112, 113, 115 may occur according to the BGP routinginformation advertised by the respective entities operating thoserouters 110, 111, 112, 113, 115. For example, the entity operatingrouter 110 may be assigned the netblock “24.158.32.0” and may causetraffic to be routed to router 110 by sending a BGP update announcing aroute with the route prefix “24.158.32.0/19”. Routers 111, 112, 113, and115 may then update their routing tables to route Internet traffic forthe netblock “24.158.32.0” to router 110 according to the BGP update andInternet traffic destined for computing device 103, 104, 106 with IPaddresses in the netblock “24.158.32.0” may flow to router 110 forrouting to those computing devices.

In a BGP attack, a malicious attacker 149 may use his or her computingdevice 150 to corrupt an AS, such as router 112, to hijack netblocksthat are not assigned to the malicious attacker 149. The computingdevice 150 of the malicious attacker 149 may cause Internet traffic tobe misrouted by announcing a malicious route with the malicious attacker149 is not actually assigned. Continuing with the preceding example ofrouter 110 being associated with netblock “24.158.32.0”, router 110 maynormally announce its routes with a routing prefix of “24.158.32.0/19”.To hijack Internet traffic intended for the netblock “24.158.32.0”through router 110, the computing device 150 of the malicious attacker149 may announce a malicious route with the routing prefix“24.158.32.0/19” at router 112. The announcement of the malicious routemay be propagated between routers 111, 112, 113, 115 according to BGPand the malicious route may be used to route Internet traffic by anyimpacted router for which the AS path length to router 112 is shorterthan the AS path length to router 110. In this manner, the maliciousattacker 149 may hijack a portion of the Internet traffic intended forcomputing devices 103, 104, and 106. Because the malicious route will beused for routing Internet traffic when the path length is shorter torouter 112, rather than the intended route by the entity actuallyassigned the netblock “24.158.32.0” (i.e., router 110) some packets willbe inaccurately routed to the malicious attacker 149. For example,Internet traffic addressed to computing device 103 sent by computingdevice 120 may be routed from router 115 to router 112 because the pathlength to router 112 would only be one hop as opposed to two hops torouter 110 via necessary router 113.

In various embodiments, the security applied by the routers 110, 111,112, 113, and 115 along BGP paths between the routers 110, 111, 112,113, and 115 may be taken into account in the path selection for routingpackets to thereby reduce the impact of BGP attacks by increasing thelength of a malicious path.

FIG. 2 is a process flow diagram illustrating an embodiment method 200for advertising a secure BGP path. In various embodiments, theoperations of method 200 may be performed by a computing device, such asrouter (e.g., 110, 111, 112, 113, 115), of an AS, such as an ISP.

With reference to FIGS. 1 and 2, in block 202 the computing device mayreceive an indication of a route prefix to advertise. As one example,the indication of a route prefix to advertise may be a BGP updatemessage received from another router. As another example, the indicationof a route prefix to advertise may be an indication that the computingdevice itself is the origin for the route prefix.

In block 204 the computing device may determine one or more currentsecurity settings. The one or more current security settings may belocal security measures applied by the computing device to packetsrouted by the AS of the computing device. Current security settings mayinclude using prefix tagging, applying local preference settings,setting maximum prefix limits, prefix filtering using RADb, certifyingresources using RPKI, implementing BGPsec, or any other local securitymeasure currently being applied by the AS of the computing device.

In block 206 the computing device may generate a BGP message advertisingthe route prefix including indications of any current security settingsas one or more path security attributes. In various embodiments, the oneor more path security attributes may indicate one or more types ofsecurity applied by the AS of the computing device, such as one moretypes of security applied by the computing device. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may be carried inthe BGP message in addition to, and in a similar manner to, AS Pathattributes. In various embodiments, the one or more path securityattributes may be indicated as bit values in the BGP message. Forexample, each bit value in a string of bit values may represent whetheror not a type of security was applied. The indication of the one or moretypes of security applied in the BGP message may provide transparency asto the local security measures implemented along an AS path. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may be indicatedas transitive attributes in the BGP message. For example, a transitiveflag may be set for the one or more path security attributes in the BGPmessage.

In block 208 the computing device may send the BGP message including oneor more path security attributes. For example, the computing device maysend the BGP message to all neighboring routers.

FIG. 3A is a process flow diagram illustrating an embodiment method 300for storing path security attributes. In various embodiments, theoperations of method 300 may be performed by a computing device, such asrouter (e.g., 110, 111, 112, 113, 115), of an AS, such as an ISP. Invarious embodiments, the operations of method 300 may be performed inconjunction with the operations of method 200 (FIG. 2).

With reference to FIGS. 1-3A, in block 302 the computing device mayreceive a BGP message including one or more path security attributes. Invarious embodiments, the one or more path security attributes may becarried in the BGP message in addition to, and in a similar manner to,AS Path attributes.

In block 304 the computing device may store path security attributes forthe route prefix associated with the BGP message. For example, thecomputing device may update a routing table to include the path securityattributes. The path security attributes may indicate the securityapplied by each ASN in the path associated with the BGP message. Forexample, the path security attributes may indicate whether or not eachAS in the path is using prefix tagging, applying local preferencesettings, setting maximum prefix limits, prefix filtering using RADb,certifying resources using RPKI, implementing BGPsec, or any other localsecurity measure.

In various embodiments, in response to storing the path securityattributes, the computing device may append its own routing information,such as its respective ASN and its own one or more path securityattributes to the routing information in the BGP message and advertisethe path to the route prefix via a new BGP message. For example, inresponse to storing the path security attributes the computing devicemay perform operations of method 200 (FIG. 2) to advertising a secureBGP path to the route prefix through the computing device. In variousembodiments, the one or more path security attributes may be carried inthe BGP message in addition to, and in a similar manner to, AS Pathattributes. In various embodiments, the one or more path securityattributes may be indicated as transitive attributes in the BGP message.

FIG. 3B illustrates an embodiment method 350 for selecting a secure BGPpath. In various embodiments, the operations of method 350 may beperformed by a computing device, such as router (e.g., 110, 111, 112,113, 115), of an AS, such as an ISP. In various embodiments, theoperations of method 350 may be performed in conjunction with theoperations of methods 200 (FIG. 2) and/or 300 (FIG. 3A).

With reference to FIGS. 1-3B, in block 352 the computing device mayreceive a packet for routing to a route prefix. The packet may be apacket received from a computing device connected to the router and maybe addressed to an IP address reachable by the route prefix. In block354 the computing device may determine any available paths to the routeprefix. For example, the computing device may compare the route prefixto entries in a routing table to identify the available paths as pathshaving the same route prefix.

In block 356 the computing device may determine a security cost for eachavailable path based at least in part on any path security attributesassociated with that respective available path. In various embodiments,security costs may be determined by applying security discountsassociated with types of security applied by each AS in the availablepaths. In various embodiments, path security attributes may be storedfor each path. The path security attributes may indicate the securityapplied by each ASN in the path from the computing device to the routeprefix. For example, the path security attributes may indicate whetheror not each AS in the path is using prefix tagging, applying localpreference settings, setting maximum prefix limits, prefix filteringusing RADb, certifying resources using RPKI, implementing BGPsec, or anyother local security measure. Security discounts for types of securitymay be stored in a memory available to the computing device, such as ina security cost table stored in a memory. For example, a security costtable may correlate security types and security discounts with oneanother. The computing device may determine match the security typesindicated by the path security attributes to the security types in thesecurity cost table and add the security discounts corresponding to thematching security types together. In some embodiments, the total of thesecurity discounts may be added to an integer value and the result maybe the security cost for an AS. As an example, security discounts may benegative values and the integer value may be one. An AS without anassociated path security attribute, or with a security attributeindicating the security type was unreported, may not receive a securitydiscount or the security discount may be zero. As such, the moresecurity applied the less the security cost may be. Each security costof each AS in the path may be added together to determine the totalsecurity cost for the path.

In block 358 the computing device may modify path lengths for availablepaths according to their respective security costs. For example, adetermined security cost may be added to the path length for anavailable path thereby resulting in a modified path length.

In block 360 the computing device may select a path for routing thepacket from the available paths based at least in part on the modifiedpath lengths. In various embodiments, the computing device may selectthe path for routing the packet with the lowest modified path length. Invarious embodiments, selecting the path may include breaking a tiebetween paths with matching modified path lengths based at least in parton the path security attributes. For example, a path applying security,or a certain type of security, may be selected over a path not applyingsecurity.

In block 362 the computing device may route the packet to the routeprefix along the selected path.

FIG. 4A is a communication system block diagram illustrating selectionof a secure BGP path A in an IP network 400 according to an embodiment.With reference to FIGS. 1-4A, an AS, such as router ASN1, may advertisea route prefix “10.0.0.0/24” to neighboring ASs, such as routers ASN2and ASN4, in a BGP message. Router ASN4 may be a conventional routerthat may not indicate path security attributes. In response to receivingthe BGP message from router ASN1, the router ASN4 may send a BGP messageadvertising the path through router ASN4 to router ASN1 and the routerprefix “10.0.0.0/24” to its neighboring router, such as router ASN3.Router ASN2 may be an embodiment router that may indicate path securityattributes. Router ASN2, for example, may apply RPKI to packets passingthrough the router as a security measure. In response to receiving theBGP message from router ASN1, the router ASN2 may send a BGP messageadvertising the path through router ASN2 to router ASN1 and the routerprefix “10.0.0.0/24” to its neighboring router, such as router ASN3 andthe BGP message may include a path security attribute indicating routerASN2 applies RPKI.

In an embodiment, router AS3 may be configured to select a secure BGPpath for routing packets. For example, in response to receiving a packetfor routing to route prefix “10.0.0.0/24”, the router AS3 may performoperations of method 350 (FIG. 3A) to select between path A throughrouter AS2 to route the packet and path B through router AS4 to routethe packet.

In an embodiment, the router ASN3 may modify the path lengths of theroutes A and B based on their respective path security attributes andmay select the shortest path based on the modified path lengths. Forexample, FIG. 4B illustrates modified path lengths between paths of theIP network 400 according to an embodiment. With reference to FIGS. 1-4B,path A may include two hops from router ASN3, i.e., a hop to router ASN2and a hop to router ASN1. The security along path A may include RPKIapplied by router ASN2 which may result in a security cost of 0.5 and nosecurity applied or indicated by router ASN1 which may result in asecurity cost of 1 for a total security cost along path A of 1.5. Thetotal security cost along path A and the path length for path A may beadded together to arrive at the modified path length of 3.5. In asimilar manner, path B may include two hops from router ASN3, i.e., ahop to router ASN4 and a hop to router ASN1. The security along path Bmay include no security applied or indicated by router ASN4 which mayresult in a security cost of 1 and no security applied or indicated byrouter ASN1 which may result in a security cost of 1 for a totalsecurity cost along path B of 2. The total security cost along path Band the path length for path B may be added together to arrive at themodified path length of 4. As path A's modified path length of 3.5 maybe less than path B's modified path length of 4, the router ASN3 mayselect path A to route the packet through to router ASN1. In thismanner, though the actual path lengths for path A and path B are thesame, i.e., 2 hops, the more secure path, path A, may be prioritizedover the less secure path, path B, in route selections by an embodimentrouter, such as router ASN3, using the modified path lengths.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an example security cost table 500according to an embodiment. With reference to FIGS. 1-5, the securitycost table 500 may include security types 502 correlated with securitydiscounts 503. In some embodiments, the security discounts 503 may bevalues, such as positive or negative values, associated with differentsecurity types 502 or the lack there off. For example, the differentsecurity types may be prefix filtering, RPKI or BGPsec, communitysecurity, AS-Path security, or none or unknown security. These securitytypes 502 may correspond to path security attributes that may beindicated in embodiment BGP messages associated with a path. In variousembodiments, the security discounts 503 may be subtracted from aninteger value assigned by default to routes, such as a default securitycost, e.g., “1”. The security discounts 503 for any path securityattributes matching the security types 502 may be subtracted from, oradded to, that default security cost to determine the security cost foreach AS in the AS path. For example, when the security discounts arenegative numbers, the security discounts may be added to the defaultsecurity cost to reduce the cost based on the security applied by eachAS. For example, and the integer value may be one. An AS without anassociated path security attribute, or with a security attributeindicating the security type was unreported, may not receive a securitydiscount or the security discount may be zero. As such, the moresecurity applied the less the security cost may be. Each security costof each AS in the path may be added together to determine the totalsecurity cost for the path. For example, an AS applying both prefixfiltering and RPKI may have its security cost reduced to zero accordingto the security cost table 500 (i.e., 1+−0.5+−0.5=0). As anotherexample, an AS applying no security or not reporting its security mayhave the default security cost of one according to the security costtable 500 (i.e., 1+0=1).

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an example path security attribute 600according to an embodiment. With reference to FIGS. 1-6, the pathsecurity attribute 600 may be a byte value carried in a BGP messageincluding eight bit positions 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608.The values at the bit positions 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608may indicate the types of security applied by an AS associated with thepath security attribute 600. For example, each bit value at the bitpositions 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608 may represent whetheror not a type of security was applied. The indication of the one or moretypes of security applied in the BGP message may provide transparency asto the local security measures implemented along an AS path. As aspecific example, bit positions 601 and 602 may be reserved, bitposition 603 may indicate whether or not AS-path security is applied butthe AS, bit position 604 may indicate whether or not BGPsec is appliedby the AS, bit position 605 may indicate whether or not RPKI is appliedby the AS, bit position 606 may indicate whether or not communitysecurity is applied by the AS, bit position 607 may indicate whether ornot prefix filtering is applied by the AS, and bit position 608 mayindicate whether or not security is not applied or is not reported bythe AS. The example bit values of “00111110” in FIG. 6 may indicate theAS associated with path security attribute 600 applies AS-path security,BGPsec, RPKI, community security, and prefix filtering. As analternative, a path security attribute for an AS that does not reportits security may be “00000001”.

FIG. 7 is a communication system block diagram illustrating selection ofa secure BGP path, path D, in an IP network 700 according to anembodiment. With reference to FIGS. 1-7, the IP network 700 may includedifferent ASs, such as transit routers 702, 703, peer router 704, ISProuter 705, ISP router 706, peer router 707, customer routers 708, 709,711, 712, and malicious router 710. In the network 700, only customerrouters 708 and 711 may apply security while the other routers, 702,703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 709, 710, 712, and 713 may not apply security.Specifically, customer routers 708 and 711 may apply prefix filteringand RPKI to packets routed through the customer routers 708 and 711. Invarious embodiments, customer routers 708 and 711 may be configured toreport their security setting using path security attributes in BGPmessages, for example by performing operations of methods 200 (FIG. 2)and/or 300 (FIG. 3A). The path security attributes may be indicated astransitive attributes in the BGP messages. In this manner, thoughrouters 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 709, 710, 712, and 713 may notapply security should any of those routers advertise paths to customerrouters 708 and/or 711, the BGP messages advertising those routes mayinclude the path security attributes advertised by customer routers 708and/or 711 themselves.

The customer router 711 may be the origin for the route prefix“10.0.0.0/24”. However, the malicious router 710 may also advertiseitself as the origin of the route prefix “10.0.0.0/24”. As such, eachrouter 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 712, and 713 may includetwo paths associated with the route prefix “10.0.0.0/24”, one a “good”path toward customer router 711 and one a “bad” path toward maliciousrouter 710. For example, transit router 703 may include a path C to themalicious router 710 for route prefix “10.0.0.0/24” that proceedsthrough ISP router 706 to malicious router 710. As such, path C may havea path length that is two hops. Transit router 703 may include a path Dto the customer router 711 for route prefix “10.0.0.0/24” that proceedsthrough ISP router 705, to customer router 708, and on to customerrouter 711. As such, path D may have a path length that is three hops.

Regardless of whether the routers 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708,709, 711, 712, and 713 apply or do not apply security themselves, therouters 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 711, 712, and 713 may beconfigured to select a secure BGP path according to various embodiments.In various embodiments, the routers 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708,709, 711, 712, and 713 may be configured to perform operations of method350 (FIG. 3B) to select a secure BGP path. Whether or not routers 706,707, and 713 are configured to select a secure BGP path according tovarious embodiments, as malicious router 710 is only a single hop fromthose routers 706, 707, and 713, packets from those routers may still berouted to the malicious router 710 because even the modified path lengthto the malicious router 710 may be less than the modified path length tocustomer router 711. However, routers father from the malicious router710 may benefit from the modified path length resulting in mitigatingmalicious router 710's BGP attack. As a specific example, in response toreceiving a packet for routing to route prefix “10.0.0.0/24”, transitrouter 703 may perform operations of method 350 (FIG. 3A) to selectbetween path C and path D.

In an embodiment, the transit router 703 may modify the path lengths ofthe routes C and D based on their respective path security attributesand may select the shortest path based on the modified path lengths. Forexample, FIG. 8 illustrates modified path lengths between paths of theIP network 700 according to an embodiment. With reference to FIGS. 1-8,path C may include two hops from the transit router 703, i.e., a hop toISP router 706 and a hop to malicious router 710. There may be noapplied or indicated security along path C which may result in asecurity cost of 1 for both ISP router 706 and malicious router 710 fora total security cost along path C of 2. The total security cost alongpath C and the path length for path C may be added together to arrive atthe modified path length of 4. In a similar manner, path D may includethree hops from transit router 703, i.e., a hop to ISP router 705, a hopto customer router 708, and a hop to customer router 711. The securityalong path D may include no security applied or indicated by ISP router705 which may result in a security cost of 1, prefix filtering and RPKIapplied by customer router 708 which may result in a security cost of 0,and prefix filtering and RPKI applied by customer router 711 which mayresult in a security cost of 0 for a total security cost along path D of4. The total security cost along path D and the path length for path Dmay be added together to arrive at the modified path length of 4. Aspath C's modified path length of 4 may be the same as the modified pathlength of path D, the transit router 703 may treat the modified pathlengths as a tie and apply a tie breaker condition. In this manner,though the actual path length for path C is shorter than path D, path Cmay not be favored over path D because the modified path lengths may bethe same. This effective de-prioritization of path C may serve tomitigate the impact of the BGP attack by malicious router 710. In someembodiments, the tie breaker condition may be to choose the path alongwhich security is applied and/or along which the greater amount ofsecurity is applied. In this manner, though the modified path lengthsfor path C and path D are the same, i.e., 4, the more secure path, pathD, may be prioritized over the less secure path, path C, in routeselections by transit router 703.

FIG. 9 is a communication system block diagram illustrating selection ofsecure BGP paths in an IP network 900 according to an embodiment. Withreference to FIGS. 1-9, the IP network 900 may include different ASs,such as customer router 901, router p1, router p2, router p3, router p4,router p5, origin router 902, and bad router 903. In the network 900,routers p1, p4, and origin router 902 may apply sufficient security tohave security costs of zero according to various embodiments. Router p2may apply partial security such that router p2 has a security cost belowthe default security cost. Routers p3, p5, and the customer router 901may not apply security and/or do not report their security types. Innetwork 900, origin router 902 may be an AS actually associated with theroute prefix “10.1.1.0/24” and bad router 903 may be a malicious ASperforming a BGP attack to cause packets to be mis-routed to it for theroute prefix “10.1.1.0/24.” In various embodiments, origin router 902,router p4, router p1, and router p2 may be configured to report theirsecurity setting using path security attributes in BGP messages, forexample by performing operations of methods 200 (FIG. 2) and/or 300(FIG. 3A). The path security attributes may be indicated as transitiveattributes in the BGP messages. In this manner, though not everycomputing device reporting a path through, or to, origin router 902,router p4, router p1, and/or router p2 may not apply security, shouldany of those computing devices advertise paths through, or to, originrouter 902, router p4, router p1, and/or router p2, the BGP messagesadvertising those routes may include the path security attributesadvertised by origin router 902, router p4, router p1, and/or router p2themselves.

Regardless of whether customer router 901 applies or does not applysecurity itself, the customer router 901 may be configured to select asecure BGP path according to various embodiments. In variousembodiments, the customer router 901 may be configured to performoperations of method 350 (FIG. 3B) to select a secure BGP path. As aspecific example, in response to receiving a packet for routing to routeprefix “10.1.1.0/24”, customer router 901 may perform operations ofmethod 350 (FIG. 3A) to select path E from router p1, through router p4,to origin router 902 because that secure path E may have the lowestmodified prefix length when security costs of the possible paths areaccounted for. Additionally, regardless of whether router p3 applies ordoes not apply security itself, the router p3 may be configured toselect a secure BGP path according to various embodiments. In variousembodiments, the router p3 may be configured to perform operations ofmethod 350 (FIG. 3B) to select a secure BGP path. As a specific example,in response to receiving a packet for routing to route prefix“10.1.1.0/24”, router p3 may perform operations of method 350 (FIG. 3A)to select path F from router p2, through router p4, to origin router 902because that secure path F may have the lowest modified prefix lengthwhen security costs of the possible paths are accounted for. As such,the transitive nature of the path security attributes may enable originrouter 902 to mitigate the BGP attack by bad router 903 because all butthe closets routers in the network (i.e., router p5) may select securepaths toward origin router 902 rather than bad router 903 for routeprefix “10.1.1.0/24”.

Various embodiments illustrated and described are provided merely asexamples to illustrate various features of the claims. However, featuresshown and described with respect to any given embodiment are notnecessarily limited to the associated embodiment and may be used orcombined with other embodiments that are shown and described. Further,the claims are not intended to be limited by any one example embodiment.For example, one or more of the operations of the methods 200, 300, and350 may be substituted for or combined with one or more operations ofthe methods 200, 300, and 350, and vice versa.

FIG. 10 is a component diagram of an example computing device suitablefor use with various embodiments. The various embodiments (including,but not limited to, embodiments discussed above with reference to FIGS.1-9) described above may also be implemented within a variety ofcomputing devices, such as a laptop computer 1010 as illustrated in FIG.10. Many laptop computers include a touch pad touch surface 1017 thatserves as the computer's pointing device, and thus may receive drag,scroll, and flick gestures similar to those implemented on mobilecomputing devices equipped with a touch screen display and describedabove. A laptop computer 1010 will typically include a processor 1011coupled to volatile memory 1012 and a large capacity nonvolatile memory,such as a disk drive 1013 of Flash memory. The laptop computer 1010 mayalso include a floppy disc drive 1014 and a compact disc (CD) drive 1015coupled to the processor 1011. The laptop computer 1010 may also includea number of connector ports coupled to the processor 1011 forestablishing data connections or receiving external memory devices, suchas a USB or FireWire® connector sockets, or other network connectioncircuits (e.g., interfaces) for coupling the processor 1011 to anetwork. In a notebook configuration, the computer housing may includethe touchpad 1017, the keyboard 1018, and the display 1019 all coupledto the processor 1011. Other configurations of the computing device mayinclude a computer mouse or trackball coupled to the processor (e.g.,via a USB input) as are well known, which may also be used inconjunction with the various embodiments.

Various embodiments (including, but not limited to, embodimentsdiscussed above with reference to FIGS. 1-9) may be implemented on anyof a variety of commercially available server devices, such as theserver device 1100 illustrated in FIG. 11. Such a server device 1100 mayinclude a processor 1101 coupled to volatile memory 1102 and a largecapacity nonvolatile memory, such as a disk drive 1103. The serverdevice 1100 may also include a floppy disc drive, compact disc (CD) orDVD disc drive 1104 coupled to the processor 1101. The server device1100 may also include network access ports 1106 coupled to the processor1101 for establishing data connections with a network connection circuit1105 and a communication network (e.g., IP network) coupled to othercommunication system network elements.

Various embodiments (including, but not limited to, embodimentsdiscussed above with reference to FIGS. 1-9) may be implemented on anyof a variety of commercially available router devices, such as therouter 1200 illustrated in FIG. 12. Such a router 1200 may include aprocessor 1206 coupled to one or more memories 1208. The router 1200 mayinclude a series of network access ports 1202 coupled to switchingcircuitry controlled by the processor 1206. The network access ports1202 may establish data connections one or more communication networks(e.g., IP networks) coupled to other communication system networkelements. The switching circuitry 1204 may be controlled by processor1206 to route packets from one or more network access ports 1202 to oneor more other network access ports 1202 to thereby interconnect one ormore communication network and communications system network elements.

The processors 1011, 1101, 1206 may be any programmable microprocessor,microcomputer or multiple processor chip or chips that can be configuredby software instructions (applications) to perform a variety offunctions, including the functions of the various embodiments describedabove. In some devices, multiple processors may be provided, such as oneprocessor dedicated to wireless communication functions and oneprocessor dedicated to running other applications. Typically, softwareapplications may be stored in the internal memory before they areaccessed and loaded into the processors 1011, 1101, 1206. The processors1011, 1101, 1206 may include internal memory sufficient to store theapplication software instructions. In many devices, the internal memorymay be a volatile or nonvolatile memory, such as flash memory, or amixture of both. For the purposes of this description, a generalreference to memory refers to memory accessible by the processors 1011,1101, 1206 including internal memory or removable memory plugged intothe device and memory within the processors 1011, 1101, 1206 themselves.

The foregoing method descriptions and the process flow diagrams areprovided merely as illustrative examples and are not intended to requireor imply that the steps of the various embodiments must be performed inthe order presented. As will be appreciated by one of skill in the artthe order of steps in the foregoing embodiments may be performed in anyorder. Words such as “thereafter,” “then,” “next,” etc. are not intendedto limit the order of the steps; these words are simply used to guidethe reader through the description of the methods. Further, anyreference to claim elements in the singular, for example, using thearticles “a,” “an” or “the” is not to be construed as limiting theelement to the singular.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, andalgorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosedherein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, orcombinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability ofhardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules,circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms oftheir functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented ashardware or software depends upon the particular application and designconstraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans mayimplement the described functionality in varying ways for eachparticular application, but such implementation decisions should not beinterpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the presentinvention.

The hardware used to implement the various illustrative logics, logicalblocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the aspectsdisclosed herein may be implemented or performed with a general purposeprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specificintegrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) orother programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic,discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed toperform the functions described herein. A general-purpose processor maybe a microprocessor, but, in the alternative, the processor may be anyconventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. Aprocessor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices,e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality ofmicroprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSPcore, or any other such configuration. Alternatively, some steps ormethods may be performed by circuitry that is specific to a givenfunction.

In one or more exemplary aspects, the functions described may beimplemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof.If implemented in software, the functions may be stored as one or moreinstructions or code on a non-transitory computer-readable medium ornon-transitory processor-readable medium. The steps of a method oralgorithm disclosed herein may be embodied in a processor-executablesoftware module and/or processor-executable instructions, which mayreside on a non-transitory computer-readable or non-transitoryprocessor-readable storage medium. Non-transitory server-readable,computer-readable or processor-readable storage media may be any storagemedia that may be accessed by a computer or a processor. By way ofexample but not limitation, such non-transitory server-readable,computer-readable or processor-readable media may include RAM, ROM,EEPROM, FLASH memory, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magneticdisk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium thatmay be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions ordata structures and that may be accessed by a computer. Disk and disc,as used herein, includes compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc,DVD, floppy disk, and Blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce datamagnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers.Combinations of the above are also included within the scope ofnon-transitory server-readable, computer-readable and processor-readablemedia. Additionally, the operations of a method or algorithm may resideas one or any combination or set of codes and/or instructions on anon-transitory server-readable, processor-readable medium and/orcomputer-readable medium, which may be incorporated into a computerprogram product.

The preceding description of the disclosed embodiments is provided toenable any person skilled in the art to make or use the presentinvention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readilyapparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles definedherein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from thespirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is notintended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to beaccorded the widest scope consistent with the following claims and theprinciples and novel features disclosed herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of selecting a secure Border GatewayProtocol (BGP) path, comprising: receiving, at a computing device, apacket for routing to a route prefix; determining, by the computingdevice, any available paths to the route prefix and path lengths for theavailable paths, wherein the path length for each respective availablepath corresponds to a hop count to the route prefix for that respectiveavailable path; determining, by the computing device, a security costfor each available path based at least in part on any path securityattributes associated with that respective available path; modifying, bythe computing device, path lengths for the available paths according totheir respective security costs by adjusting the hop count for eachrespective available path based on the respective security cost;selecting, by the computing device, a path for routing the packet fromthe available paths based at least in part on the modified path lengths;and routing, by the computing device, the packet to the route prefixalong the selected path.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the securitycosts are values ranging from zero to one.
 3. The method of claim 1,wherein the path security attributes are attributes indicated in BGPupdate messages received for the available paths.
 4. The method of claim3, wherein the path security attributes indicate one or more types ofsecurity applied by autonomous systems in the available paths.
 5. Themethod of claim 1, wherein selecting the path for routing the packetfrom the available paths based at least in part on the modified pathlengths comprises using the path security attributes as a tie breakerbetween paths having matching modified path lengths.
 6. A device,comprising: a processor configured with processor-executableinstructions to perform operations comprising: receiving a packet forrouting to a route prefix; determining any available paths to the routeprefix and path lengths for the available paths, wherein the path lengthfor each respective available path corresponds to a hop count to theroute prefix for that respective available path; determining a securitycost for each available path based at least in part on any path securityattributes associated with that respective available path; modifying, bythe computing device, path lengths for the available paths according totheir respective security costs by adjusting the hop count for eachrespective available path based on the respective security cost;selecting a path for routing the packet from the available paths basedat least in part on the modified path lengths; and routing the packet tothe route prefix along the selected path.
 7. The device of claim 6,wherein the processor is configured with processor-executableinstructions to perform operations such that the security costs arevalues ranging from zero to one.
 8. The device of claim 6, wherein theprocessor is configured with processor-executable instructions toperform operations such that the path security attributes are attributesindicated in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) update messages received forthe available paths.
 9. The device of claim 8, wherein the processor isconfigured with processor-executable instructions to perform operationssuch that the path security attributes indicate one or more types ofsecurity applied by autonomous systems in the available paths.
 10. Thedevice of claim 6, wherein the processor is configured withprocessor-executable instructions to perform operations such thatselecting the path for routing the packet from the available paths basedat least in part on the modified path lengths comprises using the pathsecurity attributes as a tie breaker between paths having matchingmodified path lengths.
 11. A non-transitory processor-readable storagemedium having stored thereon processor-executable instructionsconfigured to cause a processor to perform operations, comprising:receiving a packet for routing to a route prefix; determining anyavailable paths to the route prefix and path lengths for the availablepaths, wherein the path length for each respective available pathcorresponds to a hop count to the route prefix for that respectiveavailable path; determining a security cost for each available pathbased at least in part on any path security attributes associated withthat respective available path; modifying, by the computing device, pathlengths for the available paths according to their respective securitycosts by adjusting the hop count for each respective available pathbased on the respective security cost; selecting a path for routing thepacket from the available paths based at least in part on the modifiedpath lengths; and routing the packet to the route prefix along theselected path.
 12. The non-transitory processor-readable storage mediumof claim 11, wherein the stored processor-executable instructions areconfigured to cause a processor to perform operations such that thesecurity costs are values ranging from zero to one.
 13. Thenon-transitory processor-readable storage medium of claim 11, whereinthe stored processor-executable instructions are configured to cause aprocessor to perform operations such that the path security attributesare attributes indicated in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updatemessages received for the available paths.
 14. The non-transitoryprocessor-readable storage medium of claim 13, wherein the storedprocessor-executable instructions are configured to cause a processor toperform operations such that the path security attributes indicate oneor more types of security applied by autonomous systems in the availablepaths.
 15. The non-transitory processor-readable storage medium of claim11, wherein the stored processor-executable instructions are configuredto cause a processor to perform operations such that selecting the pathfor routing the packet from the available paths based at least in parton the modified path lengths comprises using the path securityattributes as a tie breaker between paths having matching modified pathlengths.